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Economic theory predicts that economic inefficiencies are most 
likely to occur when for-profit firms operate in noncompetitive markets 
and when firms operate on a nonprofit basis. The hospital industry 
represents the worst of all possible worlds. The industry is composed 
predominantly of nonprofit firms who operate in a climate where price 
competition is rare. To make matters worse, the industry is essentially 
regulated and works under a pricing scheme that encourages excessive 
capacity, quantities, and qualities of care. Examples of these 
inefficiencies abound in the literature. It is reported that during 
one sample year, 30 percent of the hopsitals having closed heart surgery 
facilities did not engage a single case. The results were not too 
dissimilar for those hospitals with open heart facilities--20 percent 
reporting no cases. 1 Excess capacity of this nature is not uncommon 
and poses a significant problem for the hospital in terms of increased 
costs as indicated by Berry. 2 
Economic inefficiencies of this nature have prompted numerous 
proposed remedies. These include private and public rate regulation 
and review and governmental controls on hospital expansions. Variants 
of these policy options have been tried with varying degrees of failure. 3 
As mentioned, rate review and regulation has been both private and 
public. The private initiative has primarily come from the large 
1 
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third-party insurers such as Blue Cross. While this approach has been 
significant, the public initiative has been greater in scope and detail. 
Public rate review and regulation has its roots in the Economic 
Stabilization Program of the Nixon Administration. After this program 
expired, a number of individual states embarked on review programs 
patterned after the Nixon program. These programs are referred to as 
prospective reimbursement (PR) schemes and have as an essential element 
an external authority who sets, or at least approves, payment rates. 
Under these schemes, hospitals are normally reimbursed based on a pre-
determined rate, not on the actual cost of the care provided. There is, 
then, an incentive for the hospitals to be financially concerned with the 
quantity, quality, and cost of care provided. 
An earlier variant of the public review and regulation of hospital 
rates is the cost reimbursement scheme. This approach differs from 
the perspective reimbursement approach in that with cost reimbursement, 
the hospital is reimbursed in full without regard to a predetermined 
rate. Theoretically, cost reimbursement is inferior to the perspective 
reimbursement scheme in that the.former does not provide the incentives 
to contain the cost, quantity, and quality of care that exist in the 
latter. 
Empirically, the impact of PR programs has been, at best, modest. 
Most of the studies of the impact of PR programs have led to incon-
elusive results. The most supportive of the programs is a Congressional 
Budget Office study conducted in 1979 which indicated that mandatory 
state PR programs have tended to reduce annual hospital expenditures 
4 by 3 percent. Further, a number of studies indicate that while the 
case for perspective reimbursement is strong, empirically the impact 
of the two reimbursement schemes is not significantly different. For 
example, Pauly and Drake report that hospital costs did not appear to 
significantly differ between states having.perspective reimbursement 
d h h . . b 5 an t ose aving cost reim ursement. 
Public controls on hospital expansion date back to 1964 when the 
State of New York established the first certificate of need (CON) 
program. The underlying idea in the CON approach is that excessive 
hospital expansions are the primary contributing factor in the uncon-
trolled cost increases of hospital care. Consequently, hospital cost 
increases may be restrained by controlling hospital expansion. The 
CON approach has been quite popular. By 1979, 47 states had the 
controls in effect. Further, the National Health Planning Act of 1974 
requires all states to implement CON programs by the end of 1980. 
While these programs differ substantially from state to state, the 
essential feature is the requirement of state designated agency 
approval for the entry of new hospitals and the expansion or moderni-
zation of hospital plant, equipment, and services. 
A similar but voluntary program is in force in Section 1122 of the 
Social Security Act. Under this program, if prior state agency approval 
is not granted for an expansion exceeding $100,000, the hospital is 
subject to loss of reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. 
Empirical research in this area has concentrated on the impact of 
the CON programs. In the most complete of these analyses, Salkever and 
Bice found that while the CON legislation had been successful in 
limiting the growth in beds, the impact on plant assets per bed has 
6 been perverse. The impact of the legislation then, according to the 
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authors, was to significantly change the composition without changing the 
quantity of investment. 
While these proposed remedies have been attempted, it is ironic 
that the most promising proposal, the promotion of for-profit hospitals, 
has received relatively little attention. This proposal is based on the 
assumption that a hospital's economic performance will be dep~ndent upon 
the form of ownership that exists. Within the for-profit hospital, 
there exists an owner or group of owners, who has an exclusive residual 
claim to the hospital's net income. A reasonable assumption to make 
concerning their motivation is simply that the owners' desire for the 
firm to be operated in an economically efficient, profit maximizing 
7 
manner. To meet this end, the owners retain the services of a manager, 
who is given operating control of the hospital and charged with running 
the hospital efficiently. To insure the manager's compliance with their 
objectives, the owners may assign a partial residual claim to the 
hospital's net income to the manager. In this way, the hospital manager 
is provided an incentive to operate the for-profit hospital in an 
economically efficient manner. 
The situation differs within the nonprofit hospital. Under this 
form of ownership, the owners do not have a residual claim to the 
hospital's net income. In this case, it may be inappropriate to assume 
that the owners will be motivated strictly be a desire to maximize the 
hospital's net income. Further, even if it is assumed that the nonprofit 
owners are driven by a desire to maximize the hospital's profit, by 
lacking the power to assign a partial residual claim to the manager, 
the owners may be unable to insure managerial compliance to this goal. 
The nonprofit manager does not, then, face the efficiency inducing 
5 
incentive faced by the for-profit manager. The predicted result of this 
ownership arrangement is poor economic performance. Consequently, 
providing profit incentives should tend to improve the industry's 
performance. 
Numerous authors have considered this possibility and have developed 
theoretical models which trace the poor performance of this industry to 
the predominance of nonprofit firms. To cite some examples, Newhouse 
theorizes that nonprofit hospitals have a bias against lower qualities 
8 
and quantities of care. Further, Lee has developed a Veblenian model 
of conspicuous production which attempts to explain why hospitals 
9 
acquire inputs, seemingly, without regard to the demand for their use. 
A final example of these models is found in the work of Pauly and 
Redisch who argue within their physician control model that nonprofit 
hospitals employ inputs up to the point at which the net income of each 
h . . . .. d 10 p ysician is maximize. 
Empirical studies are in general agreement with the theories of 
nonprofit hospital behavior. Ogur finds a significant difference in 
the production functions of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals and 
concludes that the result is consistent with theoretical assertions 
concerning the behavior of nonprofit hospitals. 11 Viewing hospital 
ownership as differences in property rights arrangements, Clarkson 
shows evidence which supports the general implications of the property 
rights literature. Specifically, he finds that nonprofit managers 
select easier tasks, do not use market value information as often, and 
generally do not perform managerial functions as efficiently as the 
f f . 12 or-pro it managers. Similarly, Davies uses a property rights 
framework in his examination of the relative efficiency of a public 
and private airline. Based on his results, Davies contends that the 
. f. 1 . 1 ff· · 1 13 private 1rm operates re at1ve y more e 1c1ent y. Finally, two 
studies indicate that, given the current nonprofit nature of the 
hospital industry, increased competition from for-profit entrants may 
not necessarily improve overall industry performance. Wilson and 
Jadlow, in a study of the provision of nuclear medicine services, find 
that proprietary hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit hospitals 
but that the presence of more competition is associated with less, not 
more, efficiency in the supply of such services. 14 The authors do 
conclude, however, that a shift in the institutional arrangements in 
the hospital sector in the direction of more profit incentives would 
likely result in increased overall efficiency. Lastly, in a study of 
the effects of competition and regulation on hospital bed supply, 
Joskow's empirical results indicate that higher market concentration 
15 
reduces quality competition and leads to lower excess bed supply. 
Policies designed to support the for-profit firms may then lead to 
inefficient increases on the quantity and quality of care provided. 
While the theory underlying the proposed remedy of promoting the 
for-profit hospitals is quite clear, empirically, we cannot, with much 
certainty, predict that the presence of for-profit firms will lead to 
a significant improvement in the performance of the hospital industry. 
The key to the question is whether the profit incentives that exist 
within the for-profit hospitals cause these hospitals to be operated in 
a demonstrably more efficient fashion than the nonprofit hospitals. 
The major objective of this research is to further consider this 
question. Specifically, the study will attempt to discover if signifi-
cant differences exist in the behavior of the two hospital types. 
6 
The major distinguishing feature of this work is the consideration of 
the entire productive relation. As is presented in Chapter III, the 
research considers the inputs used, outputs produced, and technical 
relationships between inputs and outputs for the two hospital types. 
Previous research has tended to be concentrated on only one of these 
three facets of the productive relation. It should be recognized that 
the research to follow does not directly address the question of whether 
for-profit entrants will significantly improve the performance of the 
industry, but rather considers whether the currently existing for-profit 
hospitals produce significantly differently than do the existing 
·nonprofit firms. If these differences are found, the task will be to 
determine if the for-profit hospitals operate more efficiently than do 
the nonprofits. If it is found that the existing for-profit hospitals 
operate more efficiently than the nonprofits, then one could reasonably 
expect the impact of entering for-profits to be positive in terms of 
overall industry performance. If such is the case, a policy designed 
to promote the profit incentives that exist within the for-profit 
hospitals would likely yield net economic benefits. 
To accomplish this task, data are examined on 120 short-term, 
acute-care hospitals in the State of Oklahoma for the years 1978 through 
1981. The data are taken from the Oklahoma Health Planning Commission's 
Annual Hospital Survey which is verified by the staff of the Commission. 
Included in the hospitals are 14 which, for this study, are classified 
as for-profit. The for-profit group includes both those hospitals 
which are owned for profit and those which are not owned but are 
managed for profit. Taken together, these two hospital types form the 
population of hospitals that operate in an.atmosphere of profit 
7 
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incentives. The remainder of the hoE3pitals are classified as nonprofit. 
This group is composed of those hospitals which are both owned and 
operated on a nonprofit basis. By comparing the behavior of the for-
profit and nonprofit groups, a determination may be made as to the 
economic significance of profit incentives in this industry. But, before 
this examination is conducted, several theoretical and conceptual steps 
are developed. 
Chapter II of this study serves two primary purposes. First, the 
theoretical models of the nonprofit firm that have been developed and 
applied to the hospital industry are discussed. In this discussion, 
special emphasis is placed on describing the differing motives that may 
come :into play for nonprofit and for-profit managers. Second, the 
chapter-concludes with a summary of the literature applying to the 
profit-nonprofit issue. 
Chapter III develops both the conceptual and statistical framework 
for the study. Also found in this chapter is a more thorough discussion 
of the data to be used in the study. Here, special attention is paid 
to the expectations that are held based on the theoretical discussion 
of Chapter II. 
The results of the empirical tests are presented and discussed in 
Chapter IV. In this discussion, emphasis will be placed on identifying 
those results which appear to be in accord with theoretical predictions. 
Finally, in Chapter V, the implications of the empirical results 
are discussed. Further, in this chapter the limitations of the research 
are noted and directions for future research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETI-IBEN 
THE NONPROFIT FIRM AND ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY 
Introduction 
When dealing with an industry composed of for-profit firms, it is 
normal to assume that the behavior of these firms will be motivated by 
a desire to maximize profits. In their attempt to maximize profits, the 
firms choose inputs and produce outputs in the most efficient manner. 
This is the typical situation in an industry operated on a for-profit 
basis but is by no means the only possibility. Numerous authors have 
questioned the realism of the profit maximizing hypothesis. 1 The most 
often listed reason for this distrust of the profit maximizing hypo-
thesis is the modern industrial phenomena of a split between the 
ownership and the management of the firm. Given this split, it is 
argued that, while the owners still desire the primary goal of the 
firm to be one of profit maximization, thernanager'smotives may diverge 
from strict accordance to this goal. Various alternatives have been 
offered in lieu of the hypothesis of profit maximization, including the 
competing goals of sales, growth, and managerial utility maximization. 2 
Under the sales maximizing strategy, the firm is thought to 
operate in a fashion designed to maximize output, subject to a profit 
constraint. The actual formulation of the constraint would differ 
between firms, but in general, the manager will maximize output, 
11 
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subject to a level of profits he or she perceives to be the minimum 
acceptable to the owners. Economically speaking, this behavior implies 
that resources will be misallocated in that the firm will be producing 
beyond the level at which profit is maximized. Sales maximization, 
therefore, leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. Given this 
inefficiency, why may sales maximization serve as a primary motivating 
force for the firm? Managers may choose to maximize sales for a number 
of reasons: (1) they may perceive their own prestige to be determined 
by the sales of their firms; (2) their income may be a function of their 
firm's sales; (3) they may desire to in~rease the market power of their 
firms; and (4) they may find it easier to acquire investment funds as 
their sales increase. Whatever the reason, however, if the firm 
operates on a sales rather than profit maximizing basis, the result is 
an economically inefficient resource allocation. 
The growth maximization hypothesis differs from the sales and 
managerial utility maximization hypotheses in that it provides a way, 
other than profit maximization, in which both the desires of the manager 
and the owner can be satisfied. Specifically, it is argued that both 
the owners and the managers have utility functions which are dependent 
upon the size of the firm. The manager, then, acts in a way which 
maximizes the firm's growth and, therby, jointly maximizes both his or 
her own and the owners' utility. In this case, the constraints faced 
by the manager are the fear of corporate takeover and the fear of 
dismissal. As in the case of sales maximization, to the extent that 
the manager is capable of increasing output beyond the profit maximizing 
level, the result will be an inefficient allocation of resources. 
13 
Finally, in the model of managerial utility maximization, the 
manager is thought to maximize his or her own utility, subject to the 
constraint of profits being at least as great as the perceived minimum 
acceptable level. Here, as in the sales maximizing model, the manager's 
goals are thought to diverge from the owners', which remain simply, 
profit maximization. It is argued that the manager's utility is 
determined by: (1) job security; (2)·the power of discretionary spending; 
(3) his or her salary; and (4) the size of the staff. In this model, 
one would expect inefficient managerial spending on emoluments, which 
would tend to generate costs above the minimum possible if the firm 
were controlled on a profit maximizing basis. 
Theoretically, then, there are a number of reasons why one might 
choose to depart from the profit maximizing hypothesis when dealing with 
an industry organized on a for-profit basis. Of primary importance, 
however, is whether this hypothesis is empirically justified. The work 
in this area is truly voluminous. 3 A general conclusion can be drawn 
which suggests that while there are, no doubt 1 cases in which the profit 
motive may not be applicable, assuming profit maximization appears to be 
a good first approximation of the motivation of for-profit firms. In 
the words of Scherer, 
Deviations, both intended and inadvertent, undoubtedly exist 
in abundance, but they are kept within more or less narrow 
bounds by competitive forces, the self-interest of stock 
owning managers, and the threat of displacement by important 
outside stockholders and corporate raiders.4 
Consequently, it appears reasonable to assume that for-profi_t 
firms behave in an economically efficient manner due to their adherence 
to the profit maximizing hypothesis. How does this apply to the 
hospital industry? It should be recalled that the entire idea of 
14 
divergent motives is based on the separation of ownership and management. 
Further, it is normally argued that the manager's interests are not in 
complete accord with the owners' who desire profit maximization. In the 
hospital industry, however, the situation is significantly more dire 
in that the firms are predominantly nonprofit in nature. Put simply, 
due to the nonprofit n,1ture of the industry, not only is there a split 
between the owners and the managers, the goals of the owners should not 
be thought to necessarily include profit maximization. Finally, while 
hospitals are not pure monopolists, they are normally rather tight 
regional oligopolists who rarely engage in price competition. In the 
hospital industry, the forces Scherer lists as keeping divergences from 
profit maximization within narrow bounds are either weak or absent. 
While competitive forces, stockholding managers, and the managerial 
fear of takeover for inefficient operations no doubt exist within the 
industry, they are not nearly as potent as they are in a for-profit 
industry. Given these facts, the behavior of the nonprofit hospital 
may well diverge from strict profit maximization. To the extent that 
this occurs, the industry is characterized by economic inefficiency. 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, the various 
theoretical models of the nonprofit hospital which detail the ways in 
which the nonprofit hospital may diverge from strict profit maximization 
will be outlined. Then, the empirical research concerning the relative 
efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit firms will be reviewed. Taken 
together, these steps should provide the present research with a 
theoretical and empirical understanding of the behavior of nonprofit 
hospitals relative to for-profit hospitals. 
The Nonprofit Hospital in Theory 
If the motivation of profit maximization is questioned in the non-
profit hospital industry, what determines ho~pital behavior? 5 Numerous 
models have been developed; some quite similar to the models discussed 
above. The earliest, and most commonly used, model is the quantity 
. . . d 1 6 maximization mo e. This approach is, in almost every way, identical 
to the sales maximizing model of Baumol. 7 Specifically, the manager of 
the hospital is thought to utilize resources so as to maximize the 
quantity of services offered by the hospital. The constraint faced by 
15 
the manager is the minimum level of surplus revenues he or she perceives 
as being acceptable. In the for-profit firm, these surplus revenues 
(profits) are distributed to the stockholders or held as internal funds. 
They serve a different purpose in the nonprofit hospital--they allow for 
the expansion of services, plant, and equipment. Should there exist no 
desire to expand, output will be maximized subject only to the constraint 
that the hospital be operated without a loss. Finally, in these models 
it is normally assumed that the quality of care is given. 
Several interesting tangents are offered to the quantity maximiza-
tion model by Feldstein8 and Rice. 9 Feldstein adds an aspect of realism 
to the analysis by assuming that, due to the rather tightly controlled 
entry conditions of the industry and the lack of information on the part 
of the consumer, the hospital care markets are essentially monopolistic 
in nature. The nonprofit hospital manager can then operate in a fashion 
designed to maximize output without the encumbrances of competition. 
Rice attempts to add institutional flavor to the quantity models 
by suggesting that hospitals provide two types of care: necessary and 
supplementary care. The key, according to Rice, is that the hospital 
16 
will behave in the traditional profit maximizing way in the provision of 
the supplementary products and then use the profits derived therein to 
allow for quantity maximization of the provision of the ~roducts perceived 
to be necessities. 
Regardless of the individual characteristics of the model, the 
outcome is the. same, economic inefficiency. This inefficiency will take 
the form of resource misallocation· in the direction of the nonprofit 
hospitals in that they will be operating at a level of output beyond 
the profit maximizing level. 
An alternative to the quantity maximization model is the quality 
maximization model. The quality model is essentially a Veblenian 
conspicuous production theory of hospital behavior and is attributed 
10 to Lee. For Lee, the hospital's managers are thought to operate so 
as to maximize their own utility which is a function of their salary, 
security, and the prestige of their hospital. Of primary importance is 
the fact that the manager's utility is tied to the status of the 
hospital. Further, it is assumed that the prestige of the hospital 
plays a dominant role in the manager's utility function. This model 
is formalized by assuming that the hospital's status is determined by 
the range and sophistication of services offered by it, relative to 
other hospitals. The manager will then operate the hospital in a way 
designed to maximize the services offered by the hospital, subject to 
the constraint of some minimum acceptable level of surplus revenues. 
The quality maximization model suggests that managers, continuously 
caught up in the race for status, will tend to acquire quality enhancing 
inputs, often without regard to the demand for the services provided by 
those inputs. The result of this model is straightforward. The 
17 
hospital will follow a pricing scheme designed to provide the level of 
surplus revenues required for the purchase and maintenance of quality 
enhancing inputs. This tendency to purchase inputs without regard to 
the demand for. the services produced by the inputs indicates resource 
misallocation in the direction of these inputs. 
A third approach to the motivation of nonprofit hospital behavior 
is offered by Newhouse11 and Feldstein. 12 This approach, referred to as 
the synthesis approach, basically combines the quantity and quality 
maximizing models. By positing a utility maximand composed of the two 
key variables, quality and quantity, the synthesis approach allows the 
managers a considerably enhanced range of choices. 
For Newhouse, the manager is not dissimilar from Lee's manager in 
h h h · 11 . . h . f h h · 1 13 tat e ors e wi attempt to maximize t e prestige o t e ospita. 
The difference here is that the manager perceives prestige to be a 
function of the quantity of output as well as the quality of the 
hospital's inputs. This desire to maximize prestige is reinforced by 
the medical staff who derive utility from the use of the most advanced 
inputs and who find it easier to attract new staff members as the 
quantities of these inputs are increased. Further, the physicians are 
also quite interested in the quantity of care provided in that they 
desire beds to be available for their patients should the need arise. 14 
In this model, it is assumed that an increase in the quality of 
care causes an increase in both the demand for care and the average 
cost of care. Further, it is assumed that equilibrium occurs where 
average revenue and average costs are equal. When there is an increase 
in the quality of care, then, it is impossible to predict whether the 
quantity of care taken will increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. 
18 
The manager is therefore, faced with a productions tradeoff curve between 
quality and quantity which may initially be of any slope. It is assumed, 
15 however, that eventually the curve will attain a negative slope. 
The task of the manager will be to choose that point of the tradeoff 
curve which yields the highest level of utility. Graphically., this 
point of maximum attainable utility will occur where this tradeoff 
curve is just tangent to the highest attainable indifference curve. 
Feldstein's synthesis model differs due to his analysis being an 
analysis not intended to explain the behavior of the nonprofit firm but 
h h f . . h . d 16 rat er t e sources o cost increases int e in ustry. A primary 
difference in the models being that here the demand for care is thought 
to be independent of the quality of care provided. Essentially, this 
model suggests that the hospital manager will, given the quantity of 
care demanded, attempt to maximize the quality of that care. It is 
important to note that the quantity of care demanded is determined by 
17 the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, care. From this 
model, a tradeoff curve between the quality and quantity of care can 
be derived. Specifically, given an increase in the supply of patient 
days, a fall in the equilibrating price will result. This fall requires 
a corresponding fall in costs so as to avoid a deficit. To reduce costs, 
the manager is required to reduce the per patient expenditures on inputs, 
thereby reducing the quality of care. 18 There is, then, a tradeoff 
between the quality and quantity of care provided. 
The economic significance of these synthesis models is clear: 
output will tend to be carried beyond the level of profit maximization 
and resources will be misallocated in the direction of prestige 
enhancing inputs. 
19 
A final alternative model of nonprofit hospital behavior is the 
physician control models of Pauly and Redisch19 and Buchanan and 
Lindsay. 20 The key to these models is that they are a reply to institu-
tional phenomena. Specifically, they note that the nonprofit hospital 
is initiated by two groups, the medical staff and the trustees who are, 
in effect, equity holders. In this industry, profits, or at least 
surplus revenues, may be earned, but they accrue to the medical staff 
not to the equity owners. The physician control models suggest that 
the hospital is primarily under the control of the medical staff. 
In the Pauly and Redisch framework, the medical staff is thought 
to operate so as to maximize the net surplus revenue, where net surplus 
revenue represents the residual of revenues which remain after non-
physician input costs are paid. In the longer run, the problem facing 
the medical staff concerns determining the appropriate size of the 
medical staff. The solution posed suggests that the medical staff will, 
in an attempt to maximize physician.profits, hire new members up to the 
point at which the addition to physician profits due to the new member 
. . 1 h f h. · h b 21 is Just equa tote cost o iring t e new mem er. Finally, in the 
Pauly and Redisch model, it is assumed that the pricing scheme will 
b f . . 22 e one o average cost pricing. A price any higher than average cost 
will tend to increase total surplus revenues but will tend to drive 
down the medical staff's net surplus revenues. 
The physician control model of Buchanan and Lindsay is a bit 
different in that it argues that the true power struggle within the 
nonprofit hospital is between the medical staff and the hospital's 
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managers, not the trustees. The authors indicate that the physicians 
normally are superior in the battle due to the managers realization 
that his or her job security is directly related to their ability to 
satisfy the medical staff. 24 Again, as in the Pauly and Redisch model, 
the hospital will be run to satisfy the desires of the physicians. 
Specifically, the hospital will tend to be inefficient in that the 
physicians are thought to be little concerned with rising costs, and 
may in fact, have a cost increasing bias due to their desire to obtain 
the most sophisticated equipment and excess staff so that their time 
is most profitably spent. 
From an economic standpoint, the physician control models suggest 
inefficiencies in several ways. First, the physician has an incentive 
to maintain the most modern facilities and equipment, without regard 
to the degree of use. Put simply, their profitability is enhanced by 
the use of these items. Similarly, the physicians have an incentive 
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to maintain excess capacity in order to provide for their own patients 
should the need arise. Further, the physicians will desire to maintain 
excessive quantities of skilled support personnel in order to enhance 
their own productivity. Finally, resources will tend to be misallocated 
due to the average cost pricing scheme. 
Economic Efficiency: The Case of For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Hospitals 
An early test of the relative efficiency of for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals was conducted by Ogur. 25 The author correctly 
points out ,that economic theory predicts that the nonprofit firm should 
tend to be less efficient than the for-profit. Specifically, since the 
nonprofit hospital is not operated on a for-profit basis, it is likely 
to offer a different mix of services, offer a different.quantity of 
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service, and engage in more within firm consumption than the for-profit. 26 
To consider whether the nonprofits do differ from the for-profits in 
these respects~ Ogur estimates a derivative of the for-profit hospitals 
production function, specifically, the logarithm of the average product 
of labor. Then, the estimated parameters of this regression are used 
to predict the value of the average product of labor that would result 
if the original for-profit firms had been nonprofit. Empirically, it 
is found that the logarithm of the average product of labor is signifi-
cantly greater in the for-profit hospitals than in the nonprofit. Ogur 
suggests that this result is consistent with the above stated theoretical 
prediction. Specifically, the nonprofit hospital is thought to be 
producing products of higher quality, treating more severe cases, and 
engaging in more within firm consumption, all of which would have the 
tendency of driving the logarithm of the average product of labor below 
h f . . . . 1 1 27 t e pro it maximizing eve. 
Kushman and Nuckton consider another aspect of the relative behavior 
of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals: their responsiveness to changes 
. d d . bl h 1 . d b · 1 · 28 in eman varia es sue as popu ation an a i ity to pay. The 
authors argue that, theoretically, for-profit hospitals have the most 
to lose by not responding quickly to demand changes. Put differently, 
the for-profit manager faces higher costs in ignoring market information 
than does the nonprofit manager. Using regression analysis, Kushman 
and Nuckton show that for-profits have been more responsive to changes 
in both the local population and the local population's ability to pay 
f h . l 29 or ospita care. Further, they report that for-profit hospitals do 
not appear to significantly increase in numbers as the local population's 
income rises. 
Another group of authors has. approached the problem within the 
property rights framework. Clarkson argues that managers in the non-
profit hospital have more latitude to deviate from profit maximization 
30 than do their for-profit counterparts. The reason for this increased 
latitude is that the nonprofit owners differ from the for-profit owner 
in that the latter view profit maximization as the only legitimate goal 
of the firm. In such a situation, the for-profit managers' success or 
failure will be directly related to their ability to maximize the firms 
profits. This may well not be the case for the managers of nonprofit 
hospitals. Empirically, Clarkson reports that nonprofit managers tend 
to select easier managerial tasks, do not use market information as 
frequently, and generally do not perform managerial functions as 
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efficiently as their for-profit counterparts. 
In another study along the property rights line, Baird argues that 
a significant proportion of the recent rises in hospital costs is 
attributable to inefficiency brought about by the nonprofit nature of 
h . d 32 t e 1.n ustry. The argument advanced is that inefficiency is brought 
about by the fact that no single agent, physician nor manager, can 
increase their own wealth by improving the hospital's performance. 
As evidence of this, Baird cites a report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Health Manpower which suggests that the existing varia-
tions in costs between hospitals is too great to be explained by 
33 factors such as differences in wages or the quality of care. 
Finally, Keating adds that in some 2000 credit unions in 1973, 
34 18 percent of the uriions' payrolls were spent on emoluments. Keating 
explains that this behavior is due to there being an absence of profit 
22 
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incentives in the industry. To improve industry performance, all that is 
required is to provide profit incentives to the managers of the 
nonprofit hospitals. 35 
Several recent studies concentrate on the impact of increased 
competition on the efficiency of the hospital industry. In the earliest 
·of its type, Joskow incorporates a queuing model to determine the impact 
of quality competition on the supply of beds. 36 The results indicate 
that quality competition declines as market concentration increases. 37 
Further, it is also found that increased market concentration tends to 
lead to lower excess capacity. Policies designed to promote entry, 
given the lack of direct price competition, may lead to uneconomic 
increases in both the quantity and quality of hospital care provided. 38 
In a related study, Wilson and Jadlow consider the relative e~ficiency 
of for-profit and nonprofit firms in the provision of nuclear medicine 
services. 39 The authors find that increased competition in the provision 
of these services tends to be associated with less economic efficiency. 
The authors do, however, argue that institutional changes in the 
direction of more profit incentives would likely improve the performance 
f h . . d 40 o tis in ustry. 
Finally, a number of researchers have considered the relative 
efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit firms in industries other than 
the hospital. For example, Davies considers the case of a public and 
private airline in Australia. 41 To identify efficiency, Davies 
calculates several productivity ratios over a 16-year period. Included 
in these ratios are the tons of freight and mail per employee and the 
number of passengers per employee. Davies results indicate that, in 
d . h . f. 42 every case, pro uctivity is greater int e private irm. 
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In an industry closely related to the hospital industry, Eisenstadt 
and Kennedy consider the factors which tend to limit inefficiency in the 
provision of health insurance. 43 Two factors are most significant: 
competitive market forces and the existence of residual claimants. 
Unfortunately for the hospital industry, neither are very strong. 
Specifically, there is a general lack of price competition and residual 
claimants who have an interest in profit maximization. 
To conclude, there are two studies from outside the hospital 
industry which indicate that for-profit firms need not operate more 
efficiently in practice than do the nonprofit. Pescatrice and Trapani 
consider the relative performance of public and private utilities in 
44 the U. S. The technique involved is to estimate simultaneously the 
capital and input demand functions for the two utility types. Then, 
with this information, relative efficiency is considered by testing 
for structural differences in the costs of production. 45 The results 
of the test indicate that the public utilities appear to be more 
efficient than the private. The remaining study is by Caves and 
Ch . h . d h . . f · 1 · · c d 46 ristensen w o consi er t e provision o rai service in ana a. 
Using freight ton miles and passenger miles as measures of productivity, 
Caves and Christensen find that the public railway is consistently more 
ff . . h h . 47 e icient tan t e private. The authors suggest that the key to 
productivity is not the property rights arrangement that exist but the 
degree of price competition that the firm faces. 
Summary of the Theoretical and 
Empirical Research 
Numerous theoretical and empirical models have been r·eviewed in 
25 
this chapter. The theoretical models suggest that the behavior of the 
nonprofit hospital is likely to diverge from strict profit maximization. 
The direction of the divergence is unclear. The nonprofit manager may 
desire to maximize the hospital's output or quality of care. Here, 
he or sRe would be attempting to maximize the prestige of the hospital. 
Alternatively, the manager may choose to maximize his or her own utility 
by increasing the size of the staff or by increasing the funds available 
for discretionary purposes. But regardless of the direction of the 
divergence, these theoretical models are consistent in one aspect: 
each predicts that for-profit hospitals are likely to be more efficient 
than the nonprofit. The empirical studies reviewed in this chapter 
are in general support of this hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL AND STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
In the first chapter of this work, it was argued that one should 
expect, theoretically, differences in motivation to exist between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospital managers. This expectation is best 
understood with an appeal to the idea of property rights. 1 It is 
thought that the for-profit manager will operate the for-profit hospital 
in an economically efficient fashion while the nonprofit manager's 
behavior may diverge from strict profit maximization. The reasons for 
this divergence in behavior are numerous but all flow from the same 
essential idea. ,The nonprofit manager lacks the efficiency inducing 
profit incentives faced by the for-profit manager. Specifically, in 
the for-profit hospital, the owner has an exclusive residual claim to 
the surplus revenues generated by the hospital. In such a situation, 
the owners' desire for the firm is likely that it be operated in a 
profit maximizing manner. Further, when the owners appoint a manager 
for the hospital, the manager's motives will also tend to include 
profit maximization. The reasoning here is simply that the owners 
may insure the conformity of the manager's motives with his or her own 
by extending a partial residual claim to the firm's profits to the 
manager. Also, the for-profit manager operates under the realization 
that his or her tenure as manager is dependent upon the performance of 
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the hospital. Not only may the owners replace the manager, but there 
exists the ever present danger of corporate takeover. Consequently, 
the manager of the for-profit hospital faces incentives which should 
induce profit maximizing behavior. 
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The situation in the nonprofit hospital differs significantly. At 
the most general level, it should be noted that the owner of the nonprofit 
hospital does not hold a residual claim to the hospital's surplus revenues. 
Given this, the assumption of a profit maximization motive on the part 
of the nonprofit hospital owner is, at best, questionable. Compounding 
the problem for the nonprofit hospital is the fact that the efficiency 
inducing incentives which face the for-profit manager are either weak 
or nonexistent in the nonprofit firm. Specifically, given that the 
owners lack a residual claim to the firm's surplus revenues, the manager 
may not realize a positive economic benefit from operating the hospital 
in the most efficient manner possible. Further, the fear of corporate 
takeover is greatly reduced by the nonprofit nature of the hospital. 
Finally, the last efficiency inducing incentive is the fear of being 
replaced by the owners of the hospital. Again, however, the strength 
of this incentive is suspect in the nonprofit firm. Specifically, when 
the owners' motivation cannot be assumed to be profit maximization, it 
should not be assumed that the manager's tenure will be determined by 
his or her ability to maximize the nonprofit hospital's surplus revenues. 
Therefore, in the nonprofit case, profit maximization should not be 
assumed in that the efficiency inducing profit incentives that exist 
in the for-profit hospital are lacking. 
If the assumption of profit maximization is relaxed for the non-
profit hospital, what does serve as the motive or motives for the 
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nonprofit manager? In the second chapter of this work several models 
of nonprofit hospital behavior were presented, each assuming a different 
managerial motive. The key to these models is that they each suggest 
testable hypotheses concerning the ways in which for-profit and nonprofit 
hospital,behavior might differ, due to these differing managerial moti-
vations. In this chapter, the predicted divergences in for-profit and 
nonprofit behavior are identified. In this way, no single model.of 
nonprofit behavior is assumed to be superior. By considering the 
predictions of each of the models, in reality, a synthesis model of the 
nonprofit hospital is constructed. 
Once the predicted differences in behavior are enumerated, 
hypotheses concerning these predictions can be developed. These 
hypotheses will then serve in the empirical tests which are designed 
to determine whether significant differences in behavior exist between 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The second part of this chapter 
will present an exact specification of the hypotheses to be tested and 
a thorough development of the methodology to be utilized in the tests. 
Finally, at the end of this chapter, a discussion of the data to 
be employed in the study is presented. 
Theoretically Predicted Differences in For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Hospital Behavior 
In the review of the literature presented in Chapter II, three 
models of the nonprofit hospital were briefly discussed: the quality 
maximization model, the physician control model, and the quantity 
maximization model. Each of these models leads to predictions concerning 
the expected divergences between for-profit and nonprofit hospital 
behavior. Consider first the quality maximization model. 2 In this 
model, as presented by Lee, the manager of the nonprofit hospital is 
thought to operate the firm so as to maximize his own utility which is 
assumed to be dependent on the status of the hospital. Of particular 
· importance is the belief that the hospital's status is determined by 
the range and sophistication of the services offered by the hospital. 3 
In order to increase the range and sophistication of services offered, 
the manager of the nonprofit hospital will purchase inputs often 
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without regard to the demand for the services provided. The only 
constraint facing the manager is the level of surplus revenues perceived 
to be minimally acceptable to the owners. 
Consequently, within the quality maximization model competition 
exists between the nonprofit hospitals, but it is in terms of the 
range of services offered and the sophistication of the procedures 
involved rather than price competition. Such a model leads to a pre-
diction concerning the relative behavior of for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals. Specifically, one should expect to find a signif~cant 
difference in the mix of cases handled by the two types of hospitals. 
The direction of this difference should be such that the nonprofits 
tend to handle a significantly larger proportion of serious cases such 
as intensive care or intensive cardiac care. The reason for this is 
simply that these relatively serious cases are those cases which require 
the use of the most sophisticated, and therefore, prestigious inputs. 
By treating a significantly more serious mix of cases, then, the 
nonprofit hospital manager can improve the relative status of the 
hospital, and thereby, increase his or her own utility. 
Given this, one theoretical prediction concerning the relative 
differences in for-profit and nonprofit hospital behavior is simply 
that one can reasonably expect significant differences to exist in the 
mix of cases handled by the two hospital types. 
Considering the physician control model, a second theoretical 
prediction is identified.4 In this model, it is assumed that the 
hospital is in the control of the staff of physicians. Given their 
control, the physicians are thought to operate the nonprofit hospital 
so as to maximize their own utility. How will this maximization scheme 
differ from the for-profit case? The differences lie in the fact that 
the physicians do not have an incentive to hold hospital costs down and 
may actually have a pro-cost incentive. Specifically, in order to 
maximize their pecuniary and nonpecuniary income from the hospital, 
the physicians may desire costly increases in both sophisticated equip-
ment and, more importantly, highly trained supporting personnel. 
The desire for the most modern, sophisticated equipment is not 
dissimilar from the prediction of the quality maximization model and 
bears no further mention. The desire for a larger staff of highly 
trained supporting personnel is, however, unique. By demanding this 
highly skilled supporting staff, the physicians are setting in motion 
forces designed to increase their own productivity. 
Given the physician control model", then, one would expect to find 
significant differences in the mix of labor inputs employed by the 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Specifically, in the nonprofit 
hospitals, it is predicted that the mix of labor skills will be more 
heavily tilted towards the relatively more skilled interns and 
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registered nurses and away from the less skilled aids, orderlies, and 
attendants than in the for-profit hospitals. 
The final model to be considered is the quantity maximization 
5 
model. This model assumes that the nonprofit hospital manager will 
purchase and combine resources so as to maximize the output of the 
hospital, subject only to the constraint of a level of surplus revenues 
perceived as being minimally acceptable. Given that this minimally 
acceptable level of surplus revenues is less than the profit maximizing 
level, the nonprofit hospital will purchase more inputs and produce a 
greater output than the for-profit hospital. 
Consequently, based on the quantity maximization model, one should 
expect significant differences to exist in the productive relationships 
of the two hospital types. It should be noted that this prediction is 
consistent with the two previously mentioned predictions. Each would 
indicate differences in the productive relationships of the two 
hospital types. Should such productive differences be found, an 
appropriate question to consider is, which of the two hospital types 
is producing more efficiently? 
Based on the theories of nonprofit hospital behavior, three 
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behavioral differences are expected between the nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals. First, a reflection of the quality maximization model should 
be found in the relatively more severe mix of cases dealt with by the 
nonprofit hospitals. Further, from the physician control model, it is 
expected that the nonprofit hospitals' mix of labor inputs will be 
relatively more skilled. Finally, from the quantity maximization model, 
as well as the other models, it is predicted that the productive 
relationships of the nonprofit hospital will differ significantly from 
those in the for-profit hospital. 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
The Hypotheses 
The theoretical models of nonprofit hospital behavior predict 
differences in the mix of cases handled, the mix of labor inputs used, 
and the productive relationships of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 
These predictions can be formalized into testable hypotheses. The 
first null hypothesis is that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
treat the same mix of cases. Similarly, the second null hypothesis is 
that the two hospital types employ an equally skilled mix of labor 
inputs. Finally, the third null hypothesis is that the for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals operate under the same productive relationships. 
From this last hypothesis, an extension is offered in the form of a 
fourth null hypothesis: the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are 
equally efficient. 
The Methodology 
Case Mix Hypothesis. Testing the first hypothesis requires 
consideration of the mix of cases dealt with by each of the hospital 
types. Much has been written concerning the multi-dimensional nature 
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of hospital output. 6 From this literature, it appears that an acceptable 
way to measure hospital output is to distribute inpatient days by the 
type of medical service provided. 7 In the present study, the case mix 
will represent the proportion of total inpatient days distributed by 
the following categories of service provided: general medical, CM-GM; 
intensive care unit, CM-ICU; intensive cardiac care unit, CM-ICCU; 
pediatrics, CM-PED; and, obstetrics and gynecology, CM-OBGYN. Given 
this, the test of the hypothesis will be constructed so as to identify 
differences that might exist between the case mixes of the two hospital 
types. The methodology to test this hypothesis is the multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA). 8 Specifically, a multivariate variable, 
case mix, will be drawn from each of the two hospital populations. 
Unlike the simple ANOVA case, the means of these variables are vectors 
rather than scalars. ANOVA, in this case, would allow a comparison of 
each case mix variable separately. For example, the ANOVA procedure 
would identify any differences that exist between CM-GM in the two 
hospital types, then CM-ICU, and so on. The problem with this approach 
is that it overlooks the very reason case mix variables are often used 
in the hospital industry. Specifically, case mix breakdowns are used 
in that it is believed that significant relationships exist between the 
various services provided in the hospital. For example, there is a 
belief that a significant relationship exists between the pediatric 
services of a hospital and that hospital's general medical offering. 
To this extent, then, the appropriate test of the hy~othesis should 
consider whether significant differences exist in the case mix 
variables, not sequentially as in the ANOVA case, but simultaneously. 
Put differently, the appropriate test is to consider whether the case 
mixes of the two hospital types taken as a whole, not individually, 
differ. The MANOVA procedure allows for just this type comparison. 
Statistically, the MANOVA, as applied to this hypothesis, is as 
follows: there exists a vector of five case mix variables, CM-GM, 
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CM-ICU,.CM-ICCU, CM-PED, and CM-OBGYM, arising from two normal 
populations--for-prQfit and nonprofit hospitals: 
The populations are assumed to have the same variance covariance 
matrices and X and Y are independent random vectors. The hypothesis 
to be tested is that the two population means are equal: 
where µX and~ represent the means of the for-profit and nonprofit 
case vectors, respectively. 
To test the hypothesis, a random sample of size n1 is drawn from 
the for-profit hospitals and of size n 2 from the nonprofit hospitals: 
i = 1, 2, 3, ... , n1 
i = 1, 2, 3, ••. , n 2 
Analogous to the ANOVA case, a MANOVA table is constructed as: 
Source Sum-of-Squares df 
Between Groups H k-1 
Error R N-k 
Total T N-1 
where His a p*p matrix of between groups sum-of-squares for each 
variable along the main diagonal and between groups cross-products in 





cross-products p*p matrix, and Tis the total sum-of-squares and cross-
products p*p matrix. As can be seen, the difference between this 
procedure and the simple one-way ANOVA is the allowance for the 
relationships among the variables as depicted in the cross-product terms. 
The test statistic used to test differences in the group means is Wilks' 
Lambda (A), where: 
for k-1 = 1 (k = 2 groups) and, under the null hypothesis: 
1 - A (dfR - p + 1) 
obs A ------ 'v F (p, r - p + 1) 
obs P 
where r equals N-2 and pis the number of variates. The null hypothesis 
is rejected for: 
1 - Aobs (dfR - p + 1) 
> F A obs p tab (p, r - p + 1, a) 
A rejection of the null would imply that significant differences exist 
between the case mixes of the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 
Should the null be rejected, a set of simultaneous confidence intervals 
may be constructed to allow identification of the mean differences of 
the case mix variables which led to the rejection. 
While, as discussed above, the MANOVA is the appropriate procedure 
to use in detecting case mix differences, the simple one-way ANOVA may 
be of some value. This is quickly realized when it is noted that 
significant differences may exist between individual case mix groupings 
which go undetected by the MANOVA procedure. The reason for this is 
that the MANOVA procedure only considers whether the case mix vector 
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means differ between the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. With 
MA.NOVA, then, a significant difference may exist between the two hospital 
types in the case mix grouping general medical (CM-GM) but this difference 
is swamped by the similarity of the other individual groupings. A 
failure to reject the null hypothesis in the MA.NOVA procedure may, then, 
be somewhat misleading. Consequently, should the null in the MA.NOVA not 
- be rejected, individual univariate one-way ANOVA procedures will be 
conducted to determine if any significant differences exist between the 
individual case mix groupings of the two hospital types. 
Statistically, the ANOVA, in this case, will be designed to test 
the hypothesis that the means of the individual case mix groupings(£) 
are equal, for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, x and y, 
respectively: 
where µxt and µyt represent the means of the individual case mix 
groupings(£) for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, x and y, 
respectively. 
where 
The appropriate test statistic for the univariate one-way ANOVA is: 
2 
nSX 
F = -;z 
p 
82 . f 1 X = variance o samp e means, 
2 S = pooled variance, p 
n = sample size, 
and (n-1) and r(n-1) are the appropriate degrees of freedom. The null 




> F . 
tab (n-1, r(n-1), a) 
Should any of the null hypotheses be rejected, it may be concluded 
that a significant difference does exist between· that particular case 
mix grouping in the two hospital types. 
Skill Mix Hypothesis. The second hypothesis to be tested is that 
the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals employ equally skilled mixes of 
labor inputs. This requires consideration of the distribution of 
hospital employees by the category of their employment. In this study, 
the hospital's personnel is distributed by the following skill mix 
categories: staff physicians, SM-DOC; interns, SM-INT; registered 
nurses, SM-RN; licensed practical nurses, SM-LPN; aids, orderlies, 
and attendants, SM-AOA; and other employees, SM-0. Determining whether 
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significant differences exist between the skill mixes of the two hospital 
types is directly analogous to the case mix hypothesis considered above. 
The appropriate procedure is again, the MANOVA. This time, rather than 
drawing samples of the for-profit and nonprofit hospital outputs, 
samples of the two hospitals labor inputs are drawn. The samples, 
arising from the two normal populations, yield n 1 and n2 skill mix 
variables for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals: 
z. 
J 
j = 1, 2, 3, ••• , n1 
j 1, 2, 3, ••. , n 2 
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The hypothesis to be tested is: 
whereµ andµ represent the means of the case mix vectors for the 
z w 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, respectively. 
Again, the appropriate test statistic is Wilks' Lambda (A), and is 
defined as before. The test rejection criteria is the same as above, in 
the case mix hypothesis. As was the case for the first hypothesis, if 
the null is rejected, a set of simultaneous confidence intervals may 
be constructed to determine which mean differences of the skill mix 
variables led to the rejection. The procedure is identical to that 
employed above in the case mix hypothesis. 
As was the case in the case mix hypothesis above, failure to reject 
the null hypothesis being considered in the MA.NOVA procedure may 
misleadingly suggest that no significant differences exist between the 
skill mix categories of the two hospital types. Again, to take this 
possibility into account, individual univariate one-way ANOVA procedures 
will be conducted. The hypothesis being tested is that the means of the 
individual skill mix groupings (g) are equal for the for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals, z and w, respectively. 
where µzg and µwg represent the means of the individual case mix 
groupings (g) for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals z and w, 
respectively. 
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The appropriate test statistic and rejection criteria are identical 
to those presented above for the case mix hypothesis and will not be 
repeated here. A,rejection of any of the individual null hypotheses in 
this section would indicate the existence of significant differences 
between the two hospital types with regard to that skill mix grouping. 
Productive Relations Hypothesis. The third hypothesis to be tested 
is that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals operate under the same 
productive relationships. Testing this hypothesis, in general terms, 
amounts to determining whether the two hospitals operate under equivalent 
production functions. An adequate specification of the hospital produc-
tion function must, then, be specified. This seems to be ra~her 
straightforward, but many problems exist in selecting a production 
function for the hospital industry. Montfort argues that the usual 
assumptions underlying the theory of production do not hold in the 
hospital sector. 9 Factors such as inefficient input combinations and 
nonsubstitutability create problems in interpreting estimates of output 
parameter values. Also, it is suggested that the Cobb-Douglas and 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution specifications are not applicable 
to hospitals, since output elasticities are dependent upon input levels. 
In order to allow for these changing elasticities, Montfort estimates 
a Transcendental Logarithmic production function. 10 The author finds 
that the Translog specification fits the hospital industry better than 
the Cobb-Douglas or the CES. This result is supported by Hellinger 
who also finds the Translog to be superior for empirical work in the 
h . l 11 ospita sector. 
The methodology to test the third hypothesis starts with the 
following form of the Translog production function: 
where 
2 2 
a0 + 8i Jn Lit + a 2 ln Kit + a 11 ln Lit + a22 ln Kit + 
a 12 (ln Lit)(ln Kit)+ b0d + b 1d ln Lit+ b2d ln Kit+ 
2 2 
b11d ln Lit+ b 22d ln Kit+ b 12d(ln Lit)(ln Kit) 
ln the natural log of the variable in question, 
Q = hospital output, inpatient days, 
K capital input, staffed beds, 
L labor input, total personnel, 
d = dummy variable representing hospital type (d = 0 for 
nonprofit and d = 1 for for-profit hospitals), 
sample sizes for the nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, 
respectively, 
i = hospital, and 
t = year. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that the for-profit and nonprofit 
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(3) 
hospitals operate under the same productive relationships. As formalized 
here, this amounts to determining whether the coefficients on the dummy 
variables in equation (3) are simultaneously equal to zero. The logic 
is simply that, if by adding the for-profit hospitals into the model 
through the dummy variables, the production function is not significantly 
altered, then it can be concluded that the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals do, in fact, operate under the same productive conditions. 
Should the coefficients on the dummy variables be found to simultaneously 
differ from zero, then the null hypothesis is rejected: This would imply 
that the two hospital types do not operate under the same productive 
conditions. The test then is: 
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b. = 0, j = 0, 1, 2, 11, 22, 12. 
J 
The appropriate test statistic for the simultaneous test of several 
. 12 parameters is: 
where ESSR = error sum-of-squares of the restricted model, 
error sum-of-squares of the unrestricted model, 
q = number of restrictions implied by the null, and 
N-k degrees of freedom in the unrestricted model. 
The null hypothesis is rejected for: 
(ESSR - ESSUR) + q 
ESS + (N-k) > F tab (q, N-k, a) UR 
The basis of this test is provided by the increase in the error 
sum-of-squares due to imposing the condition that the null is true. 
Given that the null is true, imposing the condition will increase the 
error sum-of-squares by no more than that which can be attributed to 
sampling fluctuations. Therefore, the test is designed to determine 
whether the observed increase in the error sum-of-squares is significantly 
greater than zero. Further, the estimation procedure used is ordinary 
least squares. 
Finally, it should be noted that the specification of equation (3) 
must be altered if either, or both, of the first two null hypotheses are 
rejected. Should significant differences exist in the case mixes or 
skill mixes of the two hospital types, then the implicit assumption of 
homogeneous output (inpatient days) and homogeneous input (total 
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personnel) must be rejected. The alternation in equation (3) would take 
the form of estimating the production function for each of the case mix 
categories separately, rather than simply summing over the numbers of 
inpatient days in each case mix grouping. Further, the labor variable 
would be altered by using the skill mix breakdown, adjusted for the 
particular case mix in question, rather than simply the total number of 
personnel. This adjustment is unnecessary, however, if the case mixes 
and skill mixes of the two hospital types are found not to significantly 
differ. In such a case, it would be reasonable to sum over the various 
case and skill mix categories to form the desired output and labor input 
variables. 
By estimating this variant of the Translog production function, 
then, it can be"determined whether the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
operate in the same, or a significantly different, fashion. If a 
determination is made that the two hospital types do produce in 
significantly different fashions, then a fourth hypothesis is considered. 
The fourth hypothesis is that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are 
equally efficient. To formalize this hypothesis one may rewrite the 
Translog production function of equation (3) in its component nonprofit 
and for-profit parts. For the nonprofits: 
2 2 
a0 + a 1 ln Lit+ a 2 ln Kit+ a 11 ln Lit+ a22 ln Kit+ 
al2(ln Lit)(ln Kity = Fl(Kit' Lit) (4) 
and for the for-profits: 
(a0 + b0) +(al+ b 1)ln Lit+ (a2 + b2)ln Kit+ 
2 2 (all+ bll)ln Lit+ (a22 + b22)ln Kit+ (al2 + bl2) 
(ln Lit)(ln Kit)= F2(Kit' Lit) (5) 
Given the two production functions, F1 and F2 , a test of the 
hypothesis merely requires determining if, given a set of inputs, one 
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of the production functions yields a greater level of output. Formally, 
the hypothesis is stated as: 
Intuitively, the test will be to determine whether it makes a significant 
difference which production technique, the for-profit or nonprofit, 
is employed, given a set of inputs. To do this, F2 , the production 
function of the for-profit hospitals, is constrained to be such that the 
for-profits are producing under the same productive conditions as the 
nonprofits. In other words, the coefficients on the dummy variables 
are constrained such that their effect cancels out. 13 The appropriate 
test statistic and corresponding rejection criteria are the same as 
given above for the third hypothesis test. 
Should the null be rejected, at test may be performed to determine 
the direction of the increased efficiency. Again, rewriting equation 
(3): 
ln Q = ln X + ln Z (6) 
where ln X represents the situation when d = 0, and ln Z is the case 
when only the for-profits are considered. 
The test of efficiency then becomes a question of determining 
whether the mean of ln Z is significantly different from zero (greater 
for for-profit efficiency). The appropriate test statistic is: 
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ln Z t =--
s 
where S represents the standard deviation. 
The null hypothesis of equal efficiency is rejected for: 
ln Z > t 
S c,a. 
Should this null be rejected, and the mean of ln Z be found to be 
significantly greater than zero, it can be concluded that the for-profit 
hospitals are more efficient than the nonprofits. 
Finally, it should be noted that a test of the fourth hypothesis 
becomes redundant if the third hypothesis is not rejected. This can 
most easily be seen by recalling that the third null hypothesis suggests 
that the coefficients on the ownership dummy variables are all simul-
taneously equal to zero, while the fourth null hypothesis states that 
a linear combination of the dummies is equal to zero. Clearly, if the 
third hypothesis is not rejected, then the fourth cannot be, in that 
the third would imply any linear combination of the dummies must also 
be equal to zero. 
The Data 
The data for the research outlined above are taken from the Annual 
Hospital Survey of the Oklahoma Health Planning Commission. The study 
will include responses of the 120 short-term, acute-care hospitals in 
the state for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. This data includes 
each of the variables mentioned above and has been verified by the 
staff of the Commission. Of importance for the study, 14 of the 120 
hospitals are categorized as being owned or managed for-profit. This 
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is roughly the same proportion of for-profit hospitals in the nation as 
a whole. Further, the use of actual hospital data, rather than statewide 
averages as in many studies, allows one to avoid the aggregation problems 
involved with average data. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the hypotheses that serve as the basis of ·the 
research were developed. From the theoretical models of the nonprofit 
hospital, predictions concerning the relative behavior of for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals are made. Specifically, these models suggest 
that differences should exist in the mix of cases treated by the two 
hospital types, the mix of skilled labor employed, and the productive 
conditions of the two hospital types. These theoretical predictions 
serve as the hypotheses to be tested. 
The results of the tests of the hypotheses will be reported in 
Chapter IV. The data used in the tests are taken from the Oklahoma 
Health Planning Commission. 
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The theoretical models discussed in Chapter II offer several 
testable hypotheses concerning the relative behavior of for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. These hypotheses were discussed and formally 
specified in Chapter III. The first null hypothesis is that the two 
hospital types handle the same mix of cases. From the discussion of 
Chapter III, one would expect this hypothesis to be rejected, indicating 
that the two hospital types handle significantly different mixes of 
cases. Theoretically, the direction of the difference is predicted 
to be such that the nonprofit hospitals treat proportionately more 
severe cases in which a higher quantity and quality of care is required. 1 
The second null hypothesis to be tested is that the for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals employ an equally skilled mix of labor inputs. 
Again, the theoretical models of nonprofit hospital behavior indicate 
that this hypothesis should be rejected. 2 From the physician control 
models, the direction of the differences in skill mix should be such 
that the nonprofit hospitals employ a relatively more skilled group of 
workers. 
A third null hypothesis is that the two hospital types produce 
under identical productive relationships. 3 Should this hypothesis be 
rejected, as is theoretically expected, an extension to this hypothesis 
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is considered. The extension is in the form of the fourth hypothesis, 
which is that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are equally 
efficient. Based on the discussion of each of the models of nonprofit 
hospital behavior, as well as the general discussion of the idea of 
property rights, this hypothesis is expected to be rejected. 4 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the 
empirical tests of these hypotheses. 
Tests of the Hypotheses 
The Case Mix Hypothesis 
The first null hypothesis is that the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals treat the same mix of cases. To consider this hypothesis, 
a case mix variable is defined as the proportion of inpatient days in 
each of five possible service categories: general medical, CM-GM; 
intensive care, CM-ICU; intensive cardiac care, CM-ICCU; pediatrics, 
CM-PED; and, obstetrics and gynecology, CM-OBGYM. For the samples 
of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, then, there will be a case mix 
vector representing, on average, the proportion of total inpatient 
days, in each hospital type, that are from each of the five service 
categories. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the two case mix 
vectors are the same. Formally stated, the first null hypothesis is: 
HO: µx µy 
HI: µx I µy 
~ueµ and µy are the x means of the nonprofit and for-profit case mix 
vectors, respectively. 
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The methodology employed to test this hypothesis is the MANOVA, as 
outlined in Chapter III. The sample size for the test is 345. The 
appropriate test statistic for the procedure is Wilks' Lambda (A): 5 
A 
which, with the proper adjustment, is distributed as an F-statistic 
with p, and r-p+l degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected 
for: 
1 - Aobs (dfR - p + 1) 
> F 
Aobs p tab (p, r-p+l, a) 
In this case, with 5 and 339 degrees of freedom, the observed F 
value is: 
F(5,339) = 1.18 
while, the critical value of the F distribution at the 5 percent level, 
by interpolation is: 
F = 2.24. tab (p, r-p+l,a.) 
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Therefore, the hypothesis of equal case mix means cannot be rejected. 
Failure to reject the null implies that, contrary to the theoretical 
prediction, the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals did not treat a 
significantly dissimilar mix of cases during the sample period. It 
should be recalled that the nonprofits were expected to treat a case 
mix heavily skewed to more serious cases, relative to the for-profit 
hospitals. This expectation was based on the belief that the more 
serious cases required greater quantities and qualities of care and a 
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more sophisticated mix of inputs. Consequently, by treating a 
relatively more severe mix of cases, the nonprofit manager could increase 
the prestige of the hospital, and thereby, his or her own utility. 
To subject this result to closer scrutiny, individual ANOVA 
procedures were conducted on the case mix groupings. This approach, 
as discussed in Chapter III, is not directly applicable to the hospital 
industry due to the assumed relationships among the various case mix 
groupings. It is possible, however, that significant differences 
exist between individual case mix groups between the two hospital types, 
but that this difference is swamped by the general similarity of the 
case mixes taken as a whole, when the MANOVA procedure is used. To 
consider this possibility, individual univariate one-way ANOVA 
procedures were performed. The hypothesis being tested in this procedure 
is that the means of the individual case mix groupings (t) are equal for 
the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, x and y, respectively: 
An appropriate test statistic is: 
The null hypothesis is rejected for: 
> F 
tab (n-1, r(n-1), a) 
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The results of the individual ANOVA procedures are presented in 
Table I. 
TABLE I 
CASE MIX ANOVA 
Variable Observed F df 
CM-GM 0.49 1,339 
CM-ICU 1.15 1,339 
CM-ICCU 0.40 1,339 
CM-PED 0.37 1,339 
CM-OBGYN 3.24 1,339 
(' 
The critical value of the F distribution at the 5 percent level, 
by interpolation, is: 
Ftab (n-1, r(n-1), a)= 3 •87 · 
Clearly, one is unable to reject any of the null hypotheses concerning 
the equivalence of the means of the case mix groupings. Consequently, 
the results of the ANOVA procedure indicate that, even when individual 
case mix groupings are considered, the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals are indistinguishable. This result is consistent with the 
result from the MANOVA procedure. 
Given the limitations of these tests, the first null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. This result indicates that the for-profit and 
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nonprofit hospitals did not treat significantly different mixes of cases 
during the sample period. 
The Skill Mix Hypothesis 
The second null hypothesis to be considered is that the two 
hospital types employ equally skilled mixes of labor inputs. As a 
measure of· the mix of skills employed by the hospitals the hospital's 
personnel are distributed by one of six skill mix categories: staff 
physicians, SM-DOC; interns, SM-INT; registered nurses, SM-RN; licensed 
practical nurses, SM-LPN; aids, orderlies, and attendants, SM-AOA; and 
other employees, SM-0. The proportion of employees in each category 
forms the skill mix vector to be considered in the test of the 
hypothesis. Specifically, given a sample size of 225, the hypothesis 
to be tested is that the means of the skill mix vectors are equal. 
Formally stated the hypothesis is: 
11 = ]J 
z w 
whereµ and ]J represent the means of the for-profit and nonprofit 
z w 
skill mix vectors, respectively. 
The appropriate test statistic and l!'ejection criteria are the same 
as given above in the test of the first hypothesis and are not repeated 
here. In this case, the observed F value is: 
F (6,218) = 0.32 
while the critical value of the F distribution at the 5 percent level, 
through interpolation is: 
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F b ( l ) = 2.14. ta p, r-p+, a 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of equal skill mixes cannot be 
rejected. For the sample period, then, the two hospital types did not 
employ a significantly different mix of labor inputs. Again, the result 
is contrary to the theoretical prediction which indicated that the 
nonprofits should be found to employ a relatively more skilled mix of 
labor inputs. It was thought that, by employing the more skilled mix 
of labor, the physicians could increase their own productivity, and 
thereby, their income. 
To consider the possibility that significant differences exist 
between individual skill mix groupings, but that these differences were 
swamped by the general similarity of the overall vectors, individual 
ANOVA procedures were conducted. The hypothesis being considered is 
that the means of the individual skill mix categories (g) are equal 
for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, z and w, respectively: 
The test statistic and rejection criteria are identical to those given 
above in the case mix ANOVA procedures. The results of the procedures 
are presented in Table II. 
The critical value of the F distribution, by interpolation, at 
the 5 percent level is: 
Ftab (n-1, r(n-1), a)= 3 · 89 · 
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Therefore, in no case can the null hypothesis of equal skill mixes 
between the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals be rejected. The results 
of this ANOVA procedure indicate that, as was true in regard to the 
individual case mixes, the two hospital types were indistinguishable 
with respect to the individual skill mix groupings. 
TABLE II 
SKILL MIX ANOVA 
Variable Observed F df 
SM-DOC 0.16 1,218 
SM-INT 1.07 1,218 
SM-RN 0.20 1,218 
SM-LPN 1.26 1,218 
SM-AOA 0.10 1,218 
SM-0 0.30 1,218 
Given the limitations of the procedures involved, it is concluded 
that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals did not employ significantly different mixes of 
labor inputs during the sample period. 
The Productive Relations Hypothesis 
Theoretically, it is expected that the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals operate under differing productive relations. The third 
h~pothesis to consider, therefore, is that the two hospital types 
operate under identical productive conditions. Should this null be 
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reject.ed, as is expected, then a fourth hypothesis is considered which 
indicates that the two hospitals are equally efficient. Failure to 
reject the third hypothesis, however, would render redundant the fourth 
hypothesis. Put simply, if the two hospitals do not operate in 
significantly. different fashions, one cannot be more efficient than the 
other. The third hypothesis is, then, critical to the analysis at hand. 
Testing the hypothesis that the two hospital types operate under the 
same productive conditions begins with the following form of the 
T 1 d . f. 6 rans og pro uction unction: 
ln Q. it 
where ln = the natural log of the variable in question, 
Q = hospital output, measured in inpatient days, 
K = capital input, measured 'in staffed beds, 
L = labor input, measured in total personnel, 
d dummy variable representing hospital type (d = 0 for 
nonprofit and d = 1 for the for-profit hospitals), 
n 1 = 442, and n2 = 50 for the sample sizes for the nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals, respectively, 
i = hospital, and 
t = year. 
The hypothesis to be tested is formalized as: 
b. = 0, j = 0, 1, 2, 11, 22, 12. 
J 
The appropriate test statistic is: 7 
q (ESSR - ESSUR) 
--------- "-' F (q, N-k) 
MS EUR 
where ESSR error sum-of-squares of 





q 6, number of restrictions implied by the null, 
MS EUR mean square error of the unrestricted model. 
The null hypothesis is rejected for: 
(ESSR - ESSUR) 
--------- > F MSEUR tab ( q, N-k, a) 
q 
and 
The results of this regression, where ordinary least squares was 
the estimation procedure, are given in Table III for the restricted 
model (d = 0) and Table IV for the unrestricted model (d = 1). 
Independent 
TABLE III 
RESTRICTED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE-NATURAL LOG OF INPATIENT DAYS 
Beta T-Ratio 
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Variable Coefficient (*-5%; **-1%) 
Constant 3 .115 10.53** 
ln L 0.503 3 .16* 
ln K 1.236 5.91** 
ln2L 0.135 3.34** 
ln2K 0.140 2.36* 
ln L * ln K -0.337 -3.70** 
F = 1309. 59 R2 0.9307 ESS = 42.5681 
TABLE IV 
UNRESTRICTED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, DEPENDENT 













ln L * ln K 
d * Constant 
d * ln L 
d * ln K 
d * ln2L 
d * ln2K 
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Each of the coefficients reported above have the expected sign 
and are highly significant. For example, consider the two inputs: 
labor and capital. In both cases, the coefficient of the relevant 
natural log is positive and significant beyond the 5 percent level. 
The other coefficients are equally well-behaved. Further, the model 
offers a high degree of explanatory power as evidenced by the strong 
coefficient of determination and significant F value. Specifically, 
the R2 of 0.9307 indicates that the regression explains about 93 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Finally, the 
critical value of the F distribution, at the 5 percent level, is: 
f 2. 23. 
c, a 
Therefore, with a calculated F value of 1309.59, the null hypothesis of 
an insignificant R2 can be rejected. 
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Of more importance to the third hypothesis is the comparison between 
this model and the unrestricted model, however. 
As Table IV indicates, the unrestricted model is also well behaved, 
offering a very high degree of explanatory power. In this case, the 
R2 of 0.932 indicates that the regression explains approximately 93 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Further, the null 
hypothesis of an insignificant R2 ca~ be rejected since the critical 
value of the F distribution, at the 5 percent level, is: 
f = 1.81. 
c' Cl 
Of particular importance for the hypothesis in question are the 
coefficients on the terms which represent the for-profit hospitals 
(those with the dummy variables). In general, these terms lack the 
significance of the other terms suggesting that identifying the 
for-profits adds little to the explanatory power of the model. The 
precise test of the hypothesis requires formulating the F statistic 
described above. In this case, the observed Fis: 
F (6,480) 
which gives: 
= (42.5681 - 41.6796) 7 6 
0.0866 
F (6,480) = 1.709. 
The critical value of the F distribution, at the 5 percent level is, 
by interpolation: 
Ftab (1, N-k, a)= 2• 12 • 
Therefore, the hypothesis that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
produce under the same productive relations cannot be rejected for the 
sample period. The fact that the two hospital types did not produce 
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in a significantly different fashion during the sample period indicates 
that the fourth hypothesis is redundant. Such a result is contrary to 
that predicted by the theoretical discussion of Chapter III. In that 
discussion it was noted that, due to the existence of profit incentives, 
the for-profit hospitals should be expected to produce in an economically 
efficient fashion. The reverse was predicted for the nonprofits. Due 
to the lack of profit incentives, the nonprofit hospital's behavior was 
predicted to diverge from strict economic efficiency. 
A closer viewing of Table IV indicates that, while the F test 
conducted above suggests no significant difference between for-profit 
and nonprofit, the fact that the for-profit coefficients on the natural 
log of labor and capital are significant, suggests that some difference, 
however slight, may exist. To consider this possibility, the insignifi-
cant for-profit coefficients were eliminated from the unrestricted 
regression. Thus, the regression was the original restricted model 
plus the two significant for-profit terms, the natural log of labor 
and capital. Again; however, the hypothesis could not be rejected. 
When this model was run, the two previously significant for-profit 
coefficients became insignificant. 
As a further test of this result, two additional possibilities 
were considered. First, to determine if grouping those hospitals 
which were nonprofit owned but for-profit managed together with those 
that were both for-profit owned and managed introduced a bias, the 
test of the hypothesis of equal productive conditions was replicated 
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for the latter group, alone. In this case, while the coefficients and 
levels of significance were altered for the restricted and unrestricted 
models, the result was unchanged. Specifically, no difference was 
found in the productive relations of the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals when the former included only those which were both for-profit 
owned and managed. The results of the test are not presented here in 
that the true question of this study is whether profit incentives make 
a difference in the behavior of hospitals. Therefore, grouping the 
two hospital types which operate under profit incentives is the 
appropriate procedure. Separating the two merely serves as a test of 
the result obtained when the for-profit owned and managed group was 
taken together with the nonprofit owned but for-profit managed group. 
The result obtained suggests that no bias is introduced by this 
grouping. 
Finally, it was necessary to determine if the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was reasonable, in this case. To consider the 
possibility of heteroscedasticity, a test of the Goldfeld-Quandt type 
8 
was conducted. The results of the test were such that the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected. 
Realizing the limitations of the procedures involved, it is 
found that, for the sample period, the for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals did not operate under significantly different productive 
conditions. Given this result, the fourth hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Specifically, by finding that the two do not produce 




In this chapter, the results of the empirical tests of the 
hypotheses developed in the previous chapters were presented. The 
sample chosen included the 120 short-term, acute-care hospitals in the 
State of Oklahoma for the years 1978 through 1981. The results, in 
general, indicate that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in the 
sample did not behave in significantly different economic fashions 
during the period. Specifically, it was not possible to reject any of 
the four hypotheses presented. It appears that the two hospital types 
treated the same mix of cases, employed the same mix of employees, 
and produced under the same productive conditions. The last hypothesis 
indicates further that the two hospital types were equally efficient. 
Based on the theoretical discussion of Chapter II, none of these 
results were expected. 
ENDNOTES 
1 See Lee. 
2 See Pauly and Redisch or Buchanan and Lindsay. 
3see Rice or Brown. 
4 See Di Alessi. 
5 For a discussion of this statistic, see S. Wilks, "Certain 
Generalizations in the Analysis of Variance," Biometrica, XXIV (1932), 
pp. 471-494. 
6 See Brendt and Christensen. 
7 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld. 
8s. M. Goldfeld and Richard E. Quandt, "Some Tests for 
Homoscedasticity," Journal of the American Statistical Society, 
LX (1965), pp. 539-547. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this fi~al chapter is twofold. First, the divergent 
aspects of the preceding chapters are drawn together in an attempt to 
answer the question posed in Chapter I: Do for-profit hospitals operate 
in both a different and more efficient manner than the nonprofit 
hospitals? In this discussion, special emphasis will be placed on 
identifying the theoretical underpinnings of the assumed deviations 
from strict profit maximization by the nonprofit hospitals and, 
therefore, the theoretical basis for the proposed remedy of promoting 
profit incentives within the industry. Also, in this discussion will 
be an attempt to reconcile the empirical findings of this study with 
the theoretical expectations. Second, the chapter concludes by 
assessing the implications of the study's empirical results for the 
public regulation of the industry. Finally, the limitations of the 
present study are enumerated along with proposals for future investi-
gation. 
Summary 
The hospital industry has exhibited economic inefficiencies of 
great magnitude in the recent past. The major, and most well-known, 
symptom of these inefficiencies is the rapidly rising cost of hospital 
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care. These costs have been rising with great fervor, some 150 percent 
in the period 1966 to 1982, an increase matched by no other component 
1 
of the Consumer Price Index. It must be noted that cost increases do 
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not necessarily signal economic inefficiency. In the hospital industry, 
however, the cost increases do appear to be due to underlying ineffi-
ciencies. The most prominent of these are high degrees of excess 
capacity; plant, equipment, and facility expansion that occurs without 
regard to economic necessity; and rapid increases in both the quantity 
and quality of care provided. 
Given the poor performance of the industry, numerous remedial 
proposals have been made. These include private and public rate 
regulation and review, public controls on hospital expansion, outright 
governmental control of the industry, and the promotion of profit 
incentives in the industry. This last proposal serves as the proposal 
of interest for this study. Specifically, the question was asked, 
Should the promotion of profit incentives within the hospital industry 
be expected to significantly improve the performance of the industry? 
In Chapter I, the logic of the profit incentive proposal was 
presented. 
. h 2 rig ts. 
In short, the proposal is based on the theory of property 
Consistent with this theory, it was argued that for-profit 
hospitals should be operated in an economically more efficient manner 
than nonprofit hospitals. The reason for this is simple: by lacking 
a residual claim, no individual or group of individuals within the 
nonprofit hospital can realize an addition to their wealth by insuring 
that the nonprofit hospital is operated in the most efficient manner 
possible. In the for-profit hospital, the situation is quite different. 
Within this firm, the owner is an exclusive residual claimant and may 
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insure managerial compliance by allocating a partial residual claim to 
the manager. Further, the for-profit manager must always be on guard 
against the threat of displacement or corporate takeover. Put simply, 
the for-profit hospital is likely to be operated more efficiently due to 
the efficiency inducing incentives that face the for-profit manager. 
By promoting profit incentives within the industry, then, the industry's 
performance may be improved. 
The lack of these efficiency inducing incentives in the nonprofit 
hospital is thought to. lead the nonprofit hospital into behavior patterns 
not characterized by strict profit maximization. In Chapter II, the 
theoretical models of nonprofit hospital behavior were presented and 
discussed. From this discussion, four testable hypotheses concerning 
the expected divergences in for-profit and nonprofit hospital behavior 
were developed. 
The first hypothesis is that the two hospital types treated the 
same mix of cases. This hypothesis is based on the notion that, in 
an attempt to maximize the prestige of the nonprofit hospital, the 
manager will cause the hospital to treat proportionately more severe 
cases requiring the most sophisticated technical inputs. 3 
The second hypothesis is that the two hospital types employ 
equally skilled mixes of labor inputs. Based on the physician control 
models, it is thought that the nonprofit hospitals will employ 
proportionately more highly skilled workers in an attempt to maximize 
the income of the controlling physicians. 4 
The third hypothesis is that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
operate under the same productive conditions. Should this hypothesis 
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be rejected, a fourt~ hypothesis is considered which states that the two 
hospital types are equally efficient. 
These hypotheses concerning the expected divergences in for-profit 
and nonprofit hospital behavior are the crux of the study, for if these 
null hypotheses are rejected, the result would indicate that the 
promotion of profit incentives in the industry may significantly 
improve the industry's performance. On the contrary, if it is found 
that the existing for-profit and nonprofit hospitals do not operate in 
·significantly different fashions, then great confidence should hot be 
placed in the profit incentive promotion proposal. Such a finding 
would not, however, negate the possibility that new for-profit hospitals 
might operate more efficiently than the nonprofits in that the result 
only considers existing for-profits. 
In Chapter IV, the results of the empirical tests of the hypotheses 
were reported and discussed. In each case, the hypothesis of equality 
between the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals could not be rejected. 
Specifically, it was found that the two hospital types did not, during 
the sample period, treat significantly different mixes of cases, 
employ significantly different mixes of skilled labor inputs, and 
operate under significantly different productive conditions. This 
third finding of equivalent productive conditions yields the fourth 
result: the for-profit hospitals of this sample are not more efficient 
than their nonprofit counterparts. Consequently, there were no 
discernible differences in the economic behavior of for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. 
Implications 
The findings of this study do not augur-well the possibility of 
significantly improving the performance of the hospital industry by 
promoting profit incentives. The existence of profit incentives, in 
the form of residual claimants, does not appear to insure economic 
efficiency in this industry. Rather than significantly improving the 
performance of the industry, it appears that the for-profit firms have 
been entrapped by the same efficiency-robbing behaviors characteristic 
of the nonprofit hospitals. 
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This result does not, however, imply that the institution of profit 
incentives within the industry is unnecessary. The result merely 
indicates that such incentives, on their own, are not likely to lead 
to a significant improvement in the performance of the industry. It 
may well be that profit incentives could serve as an integral part of 
the successful remedial action. Something in addition to these 
incentives is, however, required. Identification of this additional 
source of improved efficiency is beyond the scope of this study, but 
some speculation may be in order. It seems, from an economic standpoint, 
the most critical problem faced by the hospital industry is not the 
nature of the existing property rights arrangements but the lack of 
competition. Competition, no doubt, exists, but it is normally in 
the areas of quality and prestige. The key ingredient that is lacking 
is thorough price competition. The implication being suggested is not 
that property rights are unimpo!tant, but simply that there may be no 
reason to expect for-profit firms to operate in an economically 
efficient fashion when they are faced with little or no direct price 
competition. 5 To significantly improve the industry's performance, 
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then, public policy must first act so as to increase the degree of price 
competition that exists. Given a competitive atmosphere, the promotion 
of profit incentives may lead to the desired goal of increased 
efficiency. 
Limitations of the Study 
As with any study of this nature, the results of this study should 
be viewed with some degree of criticism. Specifically, the study has 
three major limitations that should be noted. 
First, the study includes only those hospitals in the State of 
Oklahoma. Immediately, then, it is recognized that the results of this 
study are only directly applicable to this State. Extending the 
implications of this study beyond the State of Oklahoma requires the 
assumption that the hospitals in Oklahoma are similar to those elsewhere. 
This is, of course, a difficult assumption to make. However, there is 
some justification for such an assumption if one recalls that the 
proportion of for-profit hospitals in Oklahoma is roughly the same as 
h .. h . hl 6 t e proportion int e nation as aw o e. Regardless of this seeming 
similarity, the results of the present study should not be extended, 
as being final, to other areas. 
A second limitation of this study is that it does not actually 
consider the behavior of entering for-profit hospitals. In the study, 
the behavior of nonprofit hospitals is compared to the behavior of the 
existing for-profit hospitals. Finding that the behavior of these two 
groups does not significantly differ does not necessarily imply that 
the behavior of entering for-profit hospitals will be indistinguishable 
from the nonprofit hospitals. It may well be that entering for-profit 
hospitals may behave differently from both the existing for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals and, through competition, lead to improved industry 
performance. To this extent, the results of the study should not be 
read so as to negate this possibility. 
The final significant limitation of this study is that it is 
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assumed, but not proved, that the for-profit hospitals are equally 
inefficient as the nonprofits. By failing to reject the third hypothesis, 
it is concluded that the two hospital types are producing with the same 
degree of efficiency. As discussed above, it is assumed that this 
result implies that the for-profit hospitals operate as inefficiently 
as the nonprofit. This is but one possibility. It may be that what 
is actually being found is that the nonprofit hospitals are operating 
in an economically efficient manner. This possibility is given little 
credence in this study, however, for several reasons. First, the 
existence of economic inefficiency in the industry is well documented. 
To argue that the nonprofit hospitals are operating in an economically 
efficient (for-profit) fashion, then, one must assume that the 
existence of the for-profit hospitals in the sample has already 
significantly altered the behavior of the nonprofits. The problem 
with this assumption is that the group of for-profit hospitals only 
comprise 11 percent of the industry. Assuming that this fraction of 
the industry could have such a profound impact on the entire industry 
seems a bit difficult to defend. Regardless, however, the point being 
made in this limitation of the work remains valid. 
Directions for Future Research 
In the light of these implications and limitations, several 
proposals for future research in the area are offered. First, given 
the assumed importance of competition in improving the industry's 
performance, one a'rea of fruitful research might be to consider the 
impact of competition on the industry's performance. While thorough 
competition does not exist, there are services offered by hospitals 
in which price competition plays an important role. The research 
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would first identify those services that appear to be provided in a 
competitive environment and then to determine if the ownership structure 
makes a difference in the efficiency of provision. of those services. 
If ownership does not make a difference, then the proposal of promoting 
profit incentives would not be a desirable policy choice. On the 
contrary, should it be found that the for-profit hospitals offer the 
services more efficiently than the nonprofit, then a case could be made 
for promoting both competition and profit incentives. 
A second proposed direction for future research is simply that 
the approach taken within this study be extended both structurally and 
geographically. Structurally, the study could be extended to consider 
hypotheses concerning the relative efficiency of chain versus 
independently managed hospitals, as well as the for-profit/nonprofit 
comparison. Geographically, the study could be given greater general 
relevance by including hospitals from different states, if not all 
states. 
A final extension proposal is to trace the behavior of for-profit 
entrants through a period of years. One of the limitations of this 
study is that it merely considers the differences between currently 
existing hospitals. It may prove valuable to trace the behavior of 
entering firms. These firms may initially show significant behavioral 
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differences which later disappear. If this is found, it may lead to a 
better understanding of the underlying causes of the industry's poor 
performance and, thereby, suggest potentially successful remedial actions. 
ENDNOTES 
1The statistics used are taken from, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, (Washington, D.C., 1983). 
2see Di Alessi. 
3see the quality maximization model of Lee. 
4see the physician control model of Pauly and Redisch or Buchanan 
and Lindsay. 
5This is essentially the point made by Caves and Christensen. 
6rn Oklahoma, the percentage of for-profit hospitals is roughly 
the same as the 11 percent nationwide average. Statistics taken from 
American Hospital Association Guide Issue (Chicago, 1983). 
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